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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN  
LARGE FAMILY AND FOUNDER FIRMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Based on arguments about long-term orientation and corporate reputation, we argue that family 
and founder firms differ from other firms with regard to corporate social responsibility. Using 
Bayesian analysis, we then show that family and founder ownership are associated with a lower 
level of corporate social responsibility concerns, whereas ownership by institutional investors is 
associated with a higher level of corporate social responsibility concerns and a lower level of 
corporate social responsibility initiatives. We conclude that it makes sense to distinguish be-
tween family, founder and institutional investors and their roles as owners or managers when 
analyzing the effects of corporate governance on corporate social responsibility. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The literature is unclear as to whether family firms or founder firms have a stronger long-
term orientation relative to other firms. Anderson & Reeb (2003), for example, argue that family 
firms are more willing to invest in long-term projects because they think across generations (see 
also Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; James, 1999; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005, 2006; Le Breton-
Miller & Miller, 2006; Porter, 1992). In contrast, Chandler (1990) suggests that for family firms, 
the “goal […] appears to have been to provide a steady flow of cash flow to owners – owners 
who were also managers” (1990, p. 390), indicating that family firms espouse a short-term per-
spective. Similar arguments are also advanced by Claessens et al. (2000, 2002), Gomez-Mejia et 
al. (2001, 2009) and Morck & Yeung (2003, 2004). 
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We analyze the question of long-term orientation in family and founder firms from the per-
spective of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We argue that firms that follow a long-term 
strategy care more strongly about their stakeholders than do other firms (Davies et al., 2003; 
Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Neubaum & Zahra, 2006), which should be reflect-
ed in a higher level of CSR. The study closest to ours is that of Dyer & Whetten (2006) (hereaf-
ter Dyer/Whetten), who find that family firms have fewer CSR-related concerns than do other 
firms. Using a similar data set, we can confirm their basic results and are able to expand their 
analysis in a number of ways. Responding to the criticism of the Dyer/Whetten study raised by 
Wiklund (2006), we use a more fine-grained definition of family firms. In particular, we distin-
guish between lone founder firms (hereafter founder firms), family firms and other firms (Miller 
et al., 2007), as well as between the ownership and management dimensions of these firms 
(Klein et al., 2005). In addition, we include a large number of additional independent variables in 
our regression models, such as the industry-wide level of CSR and the percentage of ownership 
by institutional investors, which have been found to have an effect on CSR (Amato & Amato, 
2007; King & Lenox, 2001, 2002; Neubaum & Zahra, 2006; Ziegler et al., 2007). To alleviate 
the potential problem of multicollinearity, we use Bayesian analysis (Hahn & Doh, 2006; Hansen 
et al., 2004) in addition to classical statistical analysis. In replicating the results presented by 
Dyer/Whetten with classical statistical analysis, we show that the inclusion of important control 
variables such as industry categories leads the Dyer/Whetten results to become nonsignificant, 
most likely due to a problem of multicollinearity. Using Bayesian analysis, which does not rely 
on null hypothesis significance testing and is thus more immune to multicollinearity problems 
than classical statistical analysis (Leamer, 1973), we can show that family and founder owner-
ship as well as family management are positively associated with CSR. In contrast, we find that 
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founder management and ownership by institutional investors are negatively associated with 
CSR. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section uses corporate reputa-
tion theory and the concept of long-term orientation to develop hypotheses regarding the CSR 
behavior of family and founder firms. We then introduce our data set and Bayesian analysis, the 
method used in this paper. The section that follows shows our empirical results, which are then 
discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
THEORY 
Corporate reputation theory 
Corporate reputation theory has been developed and analyzed within various disciplines, 
including strategy, marketing, corporate communication and public relations. Mahon (2002) 
combines these separate literature streams. Corporate reputation as a concept builds on the idea 
that an audience assigns a positive reputation to a firm that appears to have desirable characteris-
tics (Davies et al., 2003; Fombrun, 1996). Two key premises underlie this idea. First, people 
view firms as separate social entities rather than as a collective of individual actors (Hamilton & 
Sherman, 1996; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). Second, the audience is concerned about the firm’s 
suitability as an exchange partner and puts a high value on characteristics such as trustworthiness 
and reliability (Freemann, 1984; Fombrun, 1996; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). Stakeholders 
(Freeman, 1984) evaluate the actions of a firm and use these actions to update their view of the 
firm and its character (Love & Kraatz, 2009). If a firm makes a critical decision that is incon-
sistent with its communicated values and the historical commitments that it has made, this may 
be perceived as opportunistic behavior or unreliability, possibly changing the firm’s reputation. 
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The concept of and mechanisms behind corporate reputation theory essentially stress repu-
tation-building based on social responsibility (Waldman et al., 2006). In this effort, providing 
feedback to customers, regulators and other interested stakeholders about the environmental 
quality and social benefits of products and processes through information dissemination, labeling 
and other means of signaling becomes increasingly important for firms hoping to realize eco-
nomic benefits (Boer, 2003; Karl & Orwat, 1999; Riley, 2001). 
For example, Turban & Greening (1997) show that signaling high levels of CSR enables 
firms to recruit more innovative and motivated employees. To the degree that environmentally 
concerned employees self-select into appropriate firms, labeling and similar activities aimed at 
signaling high levels of CSR enable a firm to strengthen a reputation of endorsing corporate sus-
tainability. 
It has been argued that CSR activities at firms are ultimately aimed at building reputation-
based intangible assets (Arora & Gangopadhyay, 1995). The literature also stresses that the abil-
ity to provide positive signals of this reputation to stakeholders is becoming increasingly im-
portant for firms (Shapiro, 1983; Kirchhoff, 2000). This is especially true for family firms that, 
due to limited career perspectives, may have difficulty recruiting talented employees (Dyer, 
1989; Levinson, 1971). 
Conversely, negative signals about environmental or social performance imply negative ef-
fects on reputation, that is, the destruction of reputation-based intangible assets (Jones & Rubin, 
2001). For example, in a recent empirical study, Love & Kraatz (2009) show that through down-
sizing, firms lost more than two-thirds of their position in corporate reputation rankings on aver-
age (see also Flanagan & O’Shaughnessy, 2005; Zyglidopoulos, 2004). 
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Having established the relevance of corporate reputation as a theoretical basis, we argue in 
the following that family owners and managers identify more strongly with the firm than do non-
family owners and managers. This stronger degree of identification makes these individuals 
more concerned about corporate reputation. Family managers and owners aim to avoid actions 
that may damage the reputation of the firm and their own reputations as firm owners or manag-
ers. 
As noted in the introduction, family business literature puts a great deal of emphasis on the 
definition of family firms. This concern relates to the distinction between the ownership and 
management dimensions of family firms (Klein et al., 2005) and the separation of family firms 
from founder firms (Miller et al., 2007). In the context of CSR, it is also important to distinguish 
family owners from other large shareholders, such as institutional investors (Simerly, 1995; 
Wiklund, 2006). We develop separate hypotheses for each of these categories relying on argu-
ments from the corporate reputation literature. 
 
Family ownership and CSR 
Previous research suggests that family ownership fosters social responsibility (Block, 2010; 
Deniz & Suarez, 2005; Stavrou et al., 2007; Uhlaner et al., 2004). Family owners should feel a 
greater degree of organizational identification and are often also interested in handing over the 
firm to other owners at a later point in time (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Riketta, 2005). They should 
therefore be more concerned about the reputation of the firm and thus be more inclined than oth-
er owners to avoid reputation-damaging corporate actions. Unlike other owners, firm owners are 
often easily identifiable by society at large and by the local community in which their firm is 
located: positive or negative reputation spillovers can occur (e.g., Astrachan, 1988; Carrigan & 
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Buckley, 2008; Uhlaner et al., 2004; Wiklund, 2006). Compared to other types of owners, they 
should therefore be more likely to care about their reputation for social responsibility in the 
community in which their firm is located and should also have a higher degree of interest in 
avoiding being connected with CSR concerns by the general public. In line with this argument, it 
would seem that positive CSR activities are desirable as a way to compensate for unavoidable 
CSR concerns. 
Complementary to these considerations is the way in which family ownership enables the 
effective monitoring of management: family owners often have deep knowledge of the firm and 
its business activities (Ward, 2004), which reduces information asymmetries and allows effective 
monitoring (Demsetz, 1988; Fama, 1980). Family owners are also highly motivated to engage in 
effective monitoring because they are emotionally connected to the firm and its activities (Astra-
chan & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008).  
Another important difference between family-owned firms and other firms is that the for-
mer pursue a more balanced goal set than the latter (Chrisman et al., 2003, Lee & Rogoff, 1996; 
Steier, 2003). It has been suggested that this relates to ethical aspects (Adams et al., 1996), social 
performance (Deniz & Suarez, 2005) and environmental performance (Walls et al., 2007). A 
corollary of this notion is that family-owned firms are more likely to have more CSR strengths 
and fewer CSR weaknesses relative to other firms. They are unlikely to forfeit their balanced 
goal set to focus on profit maximization or economic performance. A related argument is that 
family firms are more used to multi-stakeholder engagements. This has partly to do with the 
wider goal set that they have but is also related to the family ties within the firm as well as the 
stronger need for family firms to pursue such engagements to compensate for the disadvantages 
that they experience as compared to their competitors (e.g., the more limited career opportunities 
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for young, high-potential individuals). Given their greater experience with multi-stakeholder 
engagements, family firms are more likely to be open to considering CSR issues and hence will 
more likely act to reduce CSR concerns and increase CSR strengths. Ultimately, these considera-
tions lead to the following two hypotheses: 
 
H1a:  Family ownership is associated with a higher level of CSR strengths. 
H1b:  Family ownership is associated with a lower level of CSR concerns. 
 
Family management and CSR 
Family ownership and family management can have different effects on family firm strate-
gy (Block, 2010; Klein et al., 2005). Thus, we develop separate hypotheses for family manage-
ment and family ownership. Family managers identify more strongly with the firm as a social 
entity than do non-family managers, which is why they are more likely to be concerned about 
corporate reputation. This more intense concern leads them to avoid developments that will have 
a negative effect on corporate reputation (Flanagan & O’Shaughnessy, 2005; Love & Kraatz, 
2009; Zyglidopoulos, 2004). Due to their strong bonds with the firm and its history, family man-
agers are less likely to consider outside options than are non-family managers. Family managers 
do not compete on the market for executives, and therefore they are less inclined to maximize the 
financial performance of the firm as a signal to this market (Block, 2010; Campbell and Marino, 
1994). In addition, due to family bonds, family managers cannot easily leave their firm, which is 
why they have to bear any negative reputation caused by low levels of CSR. Thus, as long as the 
firm does not run the immediate risk of bankruptcy, a family manager will try to avoid actions 
that damage the firm’s reputation. 
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Also, the literature proposes that family managers have stronger positions in firms than do 
outside, non-family managers (Allen & Panian, 1984; Jacobs, 1991; James, 1999) and thus that 
higher shares of family managers enable better implementation of the family’s priorities and ob-
jectives (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009; Wiklund, 2006). Given that in the preceding section, 
a generally positive stance towards CSR on the part of families as owners (Habbershon et al., 
2003; Pearson et al., 2008) was established, this argument implies an additional positive associa-
tion between family management and the implementation of CSR strengths. 
Based on these corporate reputation arguments, it can be proposed that family management 
leads to a stronger stewardship orientation within a firm (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009), of 
which a stronger CSR orientation would be one element. In addition, the involvement of family 
members in firm management increases the breadth and extent of interaction between the owning 
family and the different stakeholders of the firm. Assuming that this interaction also increases 
the CSR demands posed to the family, having family members in management positions should 
be associated with the creation of more CSR strengths and the avoidance of more CSR concerns 
than in other firms. We therefore propose the following two hypotheses: 
H2a:  Having a family CEO is associated with a higher level of CSR strengths after controlling 
for the effect of family ownership. 
H2b:  Having a family CEO is associated with a lower level of CSR concerns after controlling 
for the effect of family ownership. 
 
Founder firms and CSR 
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Moving beyond the considerations of family ownership and family management, Miller et 
al. (2007, 2010) suggest distinguishing between lone founders and businesses with more than 
one family member involved. They find that founder firms are younger, have better market valu-
ations and faster sales growth rates and spend more on R&D and capital goods than do family 
firms. 
The arguments concerning the effect of founder ownership on CSR are similar to those re-
garding the effect of family ownership on CSR (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). The negative reputa-
tional aspects of CSR concerns should have implications for founders as owners that are similar 
to those for families as owners. Still, family owners differ from founders as owners in a number 
of respects that may affect CSR behavior: family firms are often plagued by conflicts between 
members of the owning family (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2005; Levinson, 1971), a problem that is 
non-existent with lone founders as owners. This potentially gives lone founder managers an even 
stronger position than family managers in a family-owned firm in implementing proactive CSR 
initiatives that increase CSR strength and reduce CSR concerns. However, it is unclear whether 
lone founder managers will exercise their power in this direction. Previous studies have noted a 
strong entrepreneurial spirit and growth orientation on the part of founder firms (Miller et al., 
2010), which may lead to more CSR concerns and fewer CSR initiatives. 
Miller et al. (2010) note an important difference between family and founder firms: family 
owners or family managers have to deal with family stakeholders and their ‘familial’ logic, 
which lends itself to conservation. Lone founder owners or managers deal with a broader set of 
stakeholders and are hence more market-driven. They express a stronger entrepreneurial orienta-
tion. If this argument is correct, then lone founders as managers are more financially motivated 
and are driven by a more commercial agenda than family managers. The degree to which they 
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embrace CSR depends more strongly on the costs and benefits to the firm, and the demands of 
stakeholders are of lesser importance. Lone founder managers will tend to avoid costly CSR ac-
tivities that have a negative effect on the firm’s growth potential. 
Previous literature has found that implementing CSR strengths is more initially costly 
than avoiding CSR concerns (Hart, 1995). Avoiding CSR concerns today is mostly a hygiene 
factor and often relates to industry standards or minimum performance levels expected by the 
public opinion (Figge et al., 2002). Often, low-cost, standardized solutions exist. The situation is 
different for CSR strengths, where individual solutions need to be developed. We argue that lone 
founders and managers will do what is necessary to avoid CSR concerns but will not invest in 
CSR strengths if that investment limits firm growth. This leads us to the following hypotheses: 
 
H3a:  Lone founder ownership is associated with a lower level of CSR strengths. 
H3b:  Lone founder ownership is associated with a lower level of CSR concerns. 
H3c:  Having a lone founder CEO is associated with a lower level of CSR strengths. 
H3d:  Having a lone founder CEO is associated with a lower level of CSR concerns. 
 
Institutional investors and CSR 
Institutional ownership is strongly debated in the context of CSR (Spicer, 1978; 
Neubaum & Zahra, 2006). Institutional investors pool large sums of money and invest those 
sums in firms. These institutions include banks, insurance companies, pension funds, hedge 
funds and mutual funds. About 60% of total equity is owned by institutional investors (e.g., mu-
tual funds or pension funds) that have highly diversified portfolios including a limited stake in 
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each firm (Simerly, 1995). The average holding time for shares is often less than two years 
(Laverty, 1996; Porter, 1992). Institutional investors often focus on financial goals in the near 
term. They base their investment choices on limited information oriented towards predicting 
short-term stock price movements and focused on easily measurable figures such as the firm’s 
current earnings or market value. Ultimately, the funds supplied by institutional investors move 
rapidly between firms (Jacobs, 1991). 
It has been argued that the engagement of institutional investors leads to increased short-
termism (Freeman, 1984; Laverty, 1996), which in turn negatively affects the implementation of 
costly CSR policies, stifling many CSR initiatives that are not cost-efficient. When firms invest 
in CSR strengths beyond the minimum level legally required, improving corporate image or the 
ability to recruit excellent staff often emerge as important motivations. Such motivations are dif-
ficult to assess in terms of their economic benefits, and often, an attempt at an evaluation is not 
even made. This leads to the positive effects of such investments’ being overlooked or (even 
worse) purposefully neglected because limited managerial resources are allocated to the evalua-
tion of such benefits. These considerations suggest that the benefits of CSR investments are like-
ly underestimated or remain partly uncovered. Because the economic benefits of investing in 
CSR strengths are difficult to estimate, it is often perceived that CSR has a net cost and is to be 
avoided, especially if investment horizons are short, as in the case of institutional investors. 
In addition to these “short-termism”-related considerations, Wiklund (2006) points out that 
the enforcement of sanctions against institutional investors is difficult. The reason is that the 
shareholdings of these investors are often diluted. Unlike other large shareholders such as fami-
lies or founders, the ultimate owners are difficult to identify. We propose the following two hy-
potheses: 
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H4a:  Institutional ownership is associated with a lower level of CSR strengths. 
H4b:  Institutional ownership is associated with a higher level of CSR concerns. 
 
SAMPLE AND VARIABLES 
Sample 
The empirical part of this study is based on US data. The Standard & Poor’s 500 firms (as 
of July 31, 2003) are the starting point for constructing the sample. The date chosen corresponds 
to an issue of BusinessWeek in which family firms in the S&P 500 were indicated (Busi-
nessWeek, 2003).1 We used this publication as a starting point since it provides useful qualitative 
information on the ownership structures and management compositions of the 177 family firms 
covered. 
For the S&P 500 firms, we collected detailed data about the firms’ ownership structures 
and management compositions from corporate proxy statements submitted to the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the years 1994-2003. This information was mostly found in 
the definitive proxy statement (DEF 14A). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires offic-
ers, directors, and five-percent owners to disclose their holdings. Proxy statements are the most 
accurate source of information about ownership structures. In particular, proxy statements are 
more accurate than databases such as Compact Disclosure, which have some mistakes and biases 
(Anderson & Lee, 1997; Dlugosz et al., 2006). We then checked and expanded the data with in-
formation from Hoover’s Handbook of American Business, Gale Business Resources, the Twen-
tieth-Century American Business Leaders Database at Harvard Business School, Forbes Lists of 
                                                 
1  BusinessWeek (2003) defines any “company where founders or descendants continue to hold positions in top 
management, on the board, or among the company’s largest stockholders” (p. 111) as a family firm. The defini-
tion is very similar to Anderson and Reeb (2003). 
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the 400 Richest Americans, Marquis Who’s Who in America, and information available on the 
firms’ websites. In a final step, the database Compustat was used to obtain the additional firm 
data used. 
To obtain corporate social responsibility data, we relied on data from the social perfor-
mance rating service Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD).2 KLD rates the social performance 
of the S&P 500 firms since 1991 and has been used in many scientific publications (McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2000; Waddock & Graves, 1997). Combining the KLD data with our manually collect-
ed data about the firm’s ownership and management structures leads to an unbalanced panel da-
taset with 2,222 observations from 406 firms. The reduction in the number of observations per 
firm is due to the fact that some firms were not listed on the stock market over the entire period 
from 1994-2003. 
 
Variables 
Dependent variables 
As concerns our dependent variables, Wood (1991, p. 693) defined corporate social poli-
cy (CSP) as “a business organization’s configuration of principles of social responsibility, pro-
cesses of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate 
to the firm’s societal relationships”. Whilst this definition refers to a wide range of aspects such 
as the integration of such processes, principles or programs with cross-business functions (e.g., 
Wagner, 2007), one approach frequently pursued is to interpret activities and outcomes relating 
to CSR as a proxy for CSP (e.g., Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Orlitzky, 2001). Since the KLD data 
cover a wide range of activities and outcomes related to CSR, the data are well suited to analyze 
CSR. The basic independent variables of CSR initiatives and concerns correspond to those used 
                                                 
2  See http://www.kld.com/Academic (accessed January 21st, 2010). 
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in the Dyer/Whetten study. Adhering to their measurements helps us to replicate their findings 
and is a benchmark from which we can expand our analysis. 
More specifically, we use two dependent variables in our analysis: (1) CSR concerns (de-
fined as the sum of community, diversity, employee, environmental, non-US operations, product, 
and other concerns) and (2) CSR initiatives (defined as the sum of community, diversity, em-
ployee, environmental, non-US operations, product, and other initiatives). A high value (low 
value) of the variable CSR concerns (CSR initiatives) corresponds to irresponsible social man-
agement. 
 
Independent variables 
Going beyond the replication of the results from Dyer/Whetten, we incorporate additional 
control variables in our analysis and refine the definition of family- and founder firms. 
Variables related to our hypotheses. The variables ownership by lone founder, ownership 
by family, and ownership by institutional investors measure the percentages of common equity 
owned by founders, families, and institutional investors, respectively. The distinction between 
lone founder firms and family firms was introduced by Miller et al. (2007). Our classification is 
similar. Lone founder owners are defined as owners in which an owner is one of the founders 
and none of his/her family members are involved as owners. Family owners, by contrast, are 
defined as owners in which at least two members of the founding family are active in the firm as 
owners. Institutional investors are large banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, private equi-
ty firms, and large individual financial investors. The variable family CEO is an indicator varia-
ble that equals one if a member of the founding family is CEO; the variable lone founder CEO is 
an indicator variable which equals one if the founder serves as the CEO of the firm. 
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Control variables. We include the mean industry level of CSR initiatives and the mean in-
dustry level of CSR concerns in our analysis. Several studies have revealed that CSR is an indus-
try-specific variable and that not controlling for industry effects may lead to biased results (King 
& Lenox, 2001, 2002; Ziegler et al., 2007). Furthermore, achievable levels of environmental 
performance are closely tied to the firm’s industry, for example in terms of air pollution and en-
ergy consumption. Also, public scrutiny with regard to CSR is industry-specific, and hence it can 
be expected that also firms’ reactions to scrutiny will differ across industries.3 Next to these in-
dustry control variables, we also include firm size as a control variable. Extant literature has 
shown that firm size influences the level of environmental or social activities by a firm (e.g., 
Amato & Amato, 2007; Lepoutre & Heene, 2006; Stanwick & Stanwick, 1998). The larger a 
firm, the higher is also its level of CSR engagement. Furthermore, a positive link is suggested 
between size and visibility, which indirectly affects the firm’s level of CSR engagement (Bram-
mer & Millington, 2006; Gan, 2006; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996). In sum, it is necessary to 
control for firm size to avoid an omitted variables bias. Firm size is measured by the natural log-
arithm of the firm’s total assets. In addition to firm size, we also control for the firm’s capital 
structure (variable debt/assets) and the firm’s profitability (variable return on assets). All varia-
bles are described in more detail in Table A1 in the appendix. 
 
METHOD: BAYESIAN ANALYSIS 
                                                 
3  In a variant of our analysis, we also include industry dummies instead of industry means. The main estimation 
results however remain unchanged. The results are available from the authors on request. 
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We test our hypotheses with both classical and Bayesian analysis. Since Bayesian methods 
are not widely used in management research, we describe the method in some detail.4 Bayesian 
analysis relies on Bayes’ theorem of probability theory (Bayes, 1763). This theorem is given by 
 
)Pr(
)Pr()|Pr()|Pr(
y
yy   ,     (1) 
 
where   represents the set of unknown parameters, and y  represents the data. )Pr( is the prior 
distribution of the parameter  , which may be derived from theory, expert opinion, or other ex-
ternal resources. )|Pr( y  is the likelihood function, which represents the probability of the data 
y given the unknown parameter  . Pr(y) is the marginal distribution of the data y, and )|Pr( y  
represents the posterior distribution, which is the probability of the parameter   given the data y. 
Equation (1) may also be written as 
 
)Pr()|Pr()|Pr(  yy  ,      (2) 
 
where   means “proportional to.” The posterior distribution is proportional to the likelihood 
function times the prior distribution. In Bayesian analysis, inference derives from the posterior 
distribution, which states the likelihood of a particular parameter assuming a certain value. 
Bayesian methods can be particularly useful for testing theory. When testing a hypothesized rela-
tionship between two variables, Bayesian analysis proceeds according to the following process: 
first, a priori beliefs (from theory or other external resources) about the relationship of interest 
                                                 
4  See The Economist (2000) for a general discussion of Bayesian methods. Hahn and Doh (2006) and Hansen et 
al. (2004) discuss the potential contributions of Bayesian methods in management research. 
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are formulated (the prior distribution, )Pr( ). Next, we assume a probability of occurrence of 
our observed data given these a priori beliefs (the likelihood function, )|Pr( y ). In a second 
step, our observed data is used to update these beliefs. The result is the posterior distribution, 
)|Pr( y . This posterior distribution leads to a probability density function that expresses the 
relationship between the two variables. This allows for statements in terms of likely and unlikely 
parameter values. This process highlights the fundamental difference between classical and 
Bayesian methods. Bayesian analysis does not assume that there exist true and fixed coefficients; 
instead, the coefficients are regarded as being stochastic. 
In recent years, Bayesian methods have become increasingly adopted in research. First ap-
plied in macroeconomics and decision theory, Bayesian methods have become popular in other 
social sciences, notably marketing research.5 Few Bayesian studies, however, have been con-
ducted in management research contexts. A rare example is Hansen et al. (2004), who use a 
Bayesian approach to operationalize the resource-based view. Bayesian methods have strong 
small sample properties and are less sensitive to problems of multicollinearity (Hahn & Doh, 
2006; Leamer, 1973). The reason is that Bayesian methods do not rely on asymptotic theory but 
instead offer the likelihood that a particular coefficient has a positive value. The result of the 
Bayesian estimation, namely the posterior distribution, makes a statement as regards to which 
coefficient values are likely and which are not. If multicollinearity is present, the posterior will 
still reflect the updated beliefs of the posterior distribution. If anything can be learned from the 
data, it will be reflected in the posterior distribution. 
We use Bayesian methods in addition to classical methods, because they allow us making 
exact probability statements about the effects of family- and founder-related variables on corpo-
                                                 
5  Rossi & Allenby (2003) discuss the potential contributions of Bayesian statistics in the field of the latter. 
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rate social responsibility. For example, we can state the probability that family ownership or 
management leads to more social responsibility initiatives. Such a statement is not possible with 
classical methods, which can only make a statement as to whether a particular variable has an 
effect or not (i.e., the variable is significant or not). Thus, Bayesian methods can account for the 
large heterogeneity that exists in the group of family and founder firms (Klein et al., 2005). 
The technical details of our Bayesian analysis are described in appendix A3. 
 
RESULTS 
Univariate analysis 
Table 1 shows the results of a univariate analysis of the CSR of family-/founder-owned 
firms relative to other firms. Family-owned firms are defined as firms in which at least one 
member of the founding family owns five percent of common equity; founder-owned firms are 
defined as firms in which the founder(s) own(s) at least five percent of common equity. We 
compare the three types of firms on both the aggregate level of CSR concerns/initiatives and on 
the level of more fine-grained categories (e.g., community concerns/initiatives or environmental 
concerns/initiatives). 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
CSR initiatives. In line with Dyer/Whetten, we find no significant differences between CSR 
initiatives in family-owned firms/founder-owned firms and other firms on the aggregate level. 
Also, for all except two categories (or in the case of founder firms, four categories), we find no 
significant differences at the 5% significance level. The significantly different categories are en-
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vironmental initiatives and other initiatives (for founder firms, there are also product initiatives 
and community initiatives). In summary, the results of our analysis of the distinction between 
founder and family firms showed little difference from the results of Dyer/Whetten on the aggre-
gate level but produced different results on the more fine-grained category level. 
CSR concerns. Dyer/Whetten found a significant difference between the levels of CSR 
concerns in family and nonfamily firms on the aggregate level. Our findings confirm the signifi-
cant differences on the aggregate level for both family-owned firms and founder-owned firms. 
On the category level, we find significant differences for product concerns (only family-owned 
firms), environmental concerns and employee concerns (only family-owned firms) as well as for 
community concerns. Again, as with CSR initiatives, our findings are similar to those of Dy-
er/Whetten. 
 
Multivariate analysis 
Results from classical regressions 
In the classical regressions, we proceed in a manner similar to that of Dyer/Whetten. In par-
ticular, we use similar variables in our regression model and estimate random-effects models. 
Table A2 shows a correlation matrix of the variables used in the regressions. Except in the case 
of the management and ownership variables, there is little correlation among the independent 
variables. Multicollinearity may only be an issue when distinguishing between the management 
and ownership dimensions of family and founder firms. Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the 
classical regressions. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
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Replication of Dyer/Whetten: Model I in Tables 2 and 3 is specified in a way similar to that 
of Dyer/Whetten.6 Not surprisingly, we can reproduce their main findings. Combining founder 
ownership and family ownership into one variable, we find a significant negative association 
between that variable and the number of CSR concerns and a non-significant relationship with 
the number of CSR initiatives. 
Extension of Dyer/Whetten. As noted above, research on the environmental impacts of 
firms stresses the large industry sector variation in CSR (Amato & Amato, 2007; Henriques & 
Sadorsky, 1996). If industry is not controlled for, an omitted variables bias may emerge. Thus, 
we extend the model of Dyer/Whetten by including the mean levels of CSR initiatives and CSR 
concerns per industry per year as additional control variables (Model II in Tables 2 and 3). This 
modification to the model has an important effect: the relationship between family/founder own-
ership and the number of CSR concerns is no longer significant, while the newly introduced in-
dustry variables are highly significant. The key result of Dyer/Whetten disappears once industry 
effects are controlled for in the analysis. The explanatory power of the respective regressions 
also increases greatly: the R²-value of the CSR concerns regression increases from 21% to 47% 
(Table 2), while the R²-value of the CSR initiatives regression increases from 12% to 28% (Ta-
ble 3). 
Next to the issue of missing important control variables, Wiklund (2006, p. 806) points to 
the definition of what constitutes a family firm as a key element at play: “Implicit in the argu-
ment by Dyer & Whetten (2006) are three aspects of family business […] the degree of unifica-
tion of ownership and management […] share of the family’s wealth tied to the performance of 
                                                 
6  We also estimated regressions with the BusinessWeek (2003) family firm definition used by Dyer/Whetten 
and still reproduce their results in this way, but we do not report detailed estimates here for reasons of brevity. 
The results are, however, available upon request. 
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the firm […] ability of the family to liquidate its investment in the firm. […] an explicit meas-
urement of the dimensions would benefit family business research”. We fully concur with this 
statement and use more fine-grained family and founder variables. We distinguish between fami-
ly and founder involvement (Model III, Tables 3-4) as well as between the management and 
ownership dimensions of these two types of firms (Model IV, Tables 3-4). The results do not 
change substantially from those arrived at using Model II. None of the four family/founder vari-
ables have any significant association with the level of social responsibility concerns/initiatives. 
Also, the explanatory power of the model remains unchanged. The family variables closest to 
statistical significance are family ownership for CSR concerns (p=0.11, two-sided test) and fami-
ly CEO for CSR initiatives (p=0.12, two-sided test). 
As noted above, through the posterior distributions, Bayesian analysis can provide a more 
complete view of the effects of specific variables than can classical analysis. This more complete 
view may help to decrease the ambiguity in the results emerging from our classical regressions. 
 
Results from Bayesian regressions 
We estimated the regression models in Tables 2 and 3 using Bayesian methods. Generally, 
the results of Bayesian analyses are distribution functions, called the posterior distributions, of 
the effects of the variables included in the regressions. We report the medians of these distribu-
tion functions as well as the probability that the respective coefficient will have a positive value 
(Tables 4 and 5). In addition, we also graphically display the posterior distribution functions of 
the family and lone founder variables (Figures 1-8). In showing both the probability and the size 
of a particular effect, these graphical representations contain more information than do single 
metrics such as coefficient values in classical regressions. 
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Tables 4 and 5 and Figures 1-8 about here 
 
CSR concerns regressions. Table 4 displays the results of the CSR concerns regressions. 
Model I shows that the variable ownership by founder or family is negatively associated with the 
number of CSR concerns (median ß=-1.06, probability of ß>0 is 4.5%). This effect does not 
change when the industry control variable is included (Model II). Model III differentiates be-
tween founder and family ownership: the negative effect is larger with founders as owners (me-
dian ß=-1.81, probability of ß>0 is 4.9%) than with families as owners (median ß=-0.88, proba-
bility of ß>0 is 17.7%). Finally, Model IV shows that the effects of ownership and management 
act in different directions. The variables lone founder CEO (median ß=0.14, probability of ß>0 is 
86.4%) and family CEO (median ß=0.34, probability of ß>0 is 99.2%) have a positive impact on 
the level of CSR concerns, whereas the ownership variables have a negative impact. 
CSR initiatives regressions. Table 5 displays the results of the CSR initiatives regressions. 
The variable ownership by founder or family has a positive impact on CSR initiatives (median 
ß=0.28, probability of ß>0 is 69.2%, Model I). This effect does not change substantially when 
the industry control variable is included (median ß=0.16, probability of ß>0 is 62.0%, Model II). 
The results of Models III and IV show that family firms and founder firms differ with respect to 
CSR initiatives: the variables ownership by family (median ß=0.48, probability of ß>0 is 79.1%) 
and family CEO (median ß=0.24, probability of ß>0 is 96.2%) have a positive effect, whereas the 
variables ownership by founder (median ß=-1.65, probability of ß>0 is 7.0%) and founder CEO 
(median ß=-0.14, probability of ß>0 is 11.7%) have a negative effect. 
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Summary of main results 
We set out to analyze long-term orientation in family and founder firms by focusing on 
CSR, arguing that firms that adopt a long-term-oriented strategy should have relatively lower 
levels of CSR concerns and relatively higher levels of CSR strengths than other firms. We build 
hypotheses for both the ownership and management dimensions of family and founder firms. 
Corporate governance in family firms is characterized by long CEO tenures (Le Breton-
Miller & Miller, 2006; Tsai et al., 2006), effective monitoring (Chrisman et al., 2004; Demsetz, 
1988; Fama, 1980) and low information asymmetries between the firm’s ownership and man-
agement (Ward, 2004). These characteristics should have a positive impact on the firm’s degree 
of long-term orientation (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). In empirical studies, Stavrou et al. 
(2007) and Block (2010) find that family ownership is negatively associated with the likelihood 
and level of downsizing. We argue in this paper that a stronger long-term orientation on the part 
of family and founder firms should also lead to fewer CSR concerns and greater CSR strengths. 
The starting point of our analysis is the study by Dyer/Whetten, whose results we repli-
cate in our first step. In our next step, we then show that when controlling for industry-level av-
erages of CSR strengths and CSR concerns, the influence of the ownership and management 
variables on CSR becomes much weaker. When we further distinguish between family and 
founder firms as well as between their ownership and management dimensions, the results be-
come even less clear. Most importantly, family and founder firms are no longer associated with 
different levels of CSR as compared with other firms. As already suggested in the Dyer/Whetten 
study, these unclear findings are most likely due to multicollinearity problems. 
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We therefore use Bayesian analysis (Hahn & Doh, 2006; Hansen et al., 2004) to separate 
the effects of family and founder firms from the effects of control variables such as industry lev-
els of CSR or ownership by financial investors. In doing so, we find that family and lone founder 
ownership is associated with having fewer CSR concerns than other firms, whereas lone founder 
and family management seems be associated with more CSR concerns. Overall, the Bayesian 
results support hypotheses H1a, H1b, H2a, H3a, H3c, H3d, H4a, and H4b. 
 
Family firms and CSR 
Family management and family ownership seem to have differing effects on CSR concerns, 
thus supporting the argument of Wiklund (2006) that family firms are a heterogeneous group 
with regard to CSR. Our results show that families in their roles as owners seem to avoid CSR 
concerns, whereas families in their roles as managers increase the level of CSR concerns. This 
can be explained by the different objectives of the two groups. Families as owners see the firm as 
a long-term investment in the tradition and heritage of the family. Even though they have a good 
understanding of the business and its needs, they are not as involved in the operational aspects of 
the firm. They care about the reputation of the firm and want to transfer the firm to the next gen-
eration. Moreover, relative to other large shareholders such as investment funds, they can be 
more easily identified by the public as business owners and thus have to bear the consequences if 
a negative image is associated with their firm. The situation is different with families as manag-
ers. Of course, families as managers must also bear the negative consequences associated with a 
negative firm reputation. However, unlike in their role as owners, families as managers are also 
evaluated in terms of operational qualities such as profitability and firm growth. In particular, 
large non-family shareholders at family-managed firms will carefully evaluate the performance 
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of family managers. Often, family members are awarded positions as managers because of their 
status as family members (Allen & Panian, 1982; Bennedsen et al., 2007), which is why they 
may feel that they are under pressure to justify their positions in the firm through superior finan-
cial results (and make subsequent compromises with regard to CSR engagement). These consid-
erations indicate that family management can lead to lower levels of CSR relative to those at 
other firms. 
 
Founder firms and CSR 
Our results show that founder firms differ from family firms and other firms with regard to 
CSR. Relative to other firms, firms with founders as managers are associated with a lower level 
of CSR initiatives and a higher level of CSR concerns. This finding is in line with recent research 
by Miller et al. (2010). The negative association of founder management with CSR initiatives 
may be related to the fact that lone founders are very ambitious in expanding their business and 
hence require that most of the firm’s resources be allocated to growth initiatives. They have built 
up the business themselves and use entrepreneurial logic to steer their firms. They care primarily 
about the business and how it can grow and remain competitive. Founders as managers care less 
about the needs of various outside stakeholder groups. Interestingly, we find that founder owners 
are associated with a lower level of CSR concerns. The explanation for this finding may be simi-
lar to that for the influence of families as owners. Compared to rather anonymous shareholders 
such as investment funds, founders as owners can be easily identified by the public as business 
owners. Thus, any negative image associated with a firm that has many CSR concerns spills over 
to them individually, whereas institutional investors as shareholders are less concerned with this 
association. Thus, to avoid spillover  from a negative reputation, founders as owners will require 
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the firm to do what is necessary to avoid CSR concerns. However, they have little ambition to 
score high in terms of CSR strengths. They will sacrifice building CSR strengths to use the 
firm’s resources for firm growth. This argument is consistent with the findings of previous re-
search indicating that realizing CSR strengths is more expensive than avoiding CSR concerns. 
Moreover, avoiding concerns is in many cases a (legal or societal) requirement that needs to be 
fulfilled as part of “good housekeeping of corporate citizens” (whereas realizing CSR strengths 
is more often optional from a legal and societal standpoint). 
 
Institutional investors and CSR 
In this paper, we contribute to the discussion about the effects of institutional ownership on 
CSR (Neubaum & Zahra, 2006; Simerly, 1995; Spicer, 1978). Ownership by institutional inves-
tors leads to more CSR concerns and fewer CSR initiatives relative to the number pursued by 
other firms. We explain this finding in two ways. First, as mentioned by Wiklund (2006), institu-
tional investors as owners are more difficult to identify than are other large shareholders. For 
instance, investment funds bundle the investments of several thousand individuals. There is not a 
single individual or family that can be blamed if the firm is not fulfilling its obligation to its 
stakeholders to be socially responsible. Society finds it difficult to monitor the social behavior of 
these types of shareholders. Secondly, the incentives driving the management of an investment 
fund are focused on the short-term and are evaluated in terms of the return on investment (ROI) 
achieved for their investors. They will be promoted or qualify for bonus pay if they achieve ROIs 
superior to those of other investment funds. To do so, they will exert pressure on the manage-
ment of their portfolio firms to pay out dividends or increase stock market value through strong 
financial results (Porter, 1992). The holding period for stocks for institutional investors is often 
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short. In fact, these investors may even pursue short-term trading strategies such as buying or 
selling stock depending on short-term market movements (Froot et al., 1992; Johnson & Kaplan, 
1987; Laverty, 1996; Porter, 1992). 
 
Future research 
Our findings also cannot fully rule out the possibility of reverse or dual causality. Causality 
is not easily testable in empirical research, but several publications argue for reverse or dual cau-
sality in related contexts (e.g., Orlitzky & Swanson, 2008; Ziegler & Seijas-Nogareda, 2009; 
Wiklund, 2006). For example, Orlitzky & Swanson (2008) show the existence of a reverse-
causal relationship between financial performance and social performance, suggesting that only 
firms with sufficient financial slack become involved in CSR programs and that firms that are 
financially successful are expected to express higher levels of CSR. Similarly, a ‘noblesse 
oblige’ view has been proposed regarding family-owned firms, in which it is theorized that nor-
mative pressure increases with improving financial performance and that family-owned firms 
often demonstrate better financial performance (Kepner, 1983). Wiklund (2006) argues that fam-
ily firms have more of their wealth tied to firm reputation and therefore invest more to realize 
CSR strengths and avoid CSR concerns so as to maintain a good reputation and safeguard their 
financial wealth. Taken together with the earlier argument, this implies dual causality. Future 
research should therefore attempt to analyze this concept in greater detail in the context of family 
firms, especially with regard to the association of CSR with financial performance. 
 
REFERENCES 
Adams, J., Taschian, A. & Shore, T. (1996). Ethics in family and nonfamily owned firms: An 
exploratory study. Family Business Review, 9(2), 157-170. 
 29
Allen, M. P. & Panian, S. K. (1982). Power, performance, and succession in the large corpora-
tion. Administrative Science Quarterly, 27(4), 538-547. 
Amato, L. H. & Amato, C. H. (2007). The effects of firm size and industry on corporate giving. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 72(3), 229-241. 
Anderson, R. C. & Lee, D. S. (1997). Ownership studies: the data source does matter. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32(3), 311-329. 
Anderson, R. C. & Reeb, D. R. (2003). Founding family ownership and firm performance: evi-
dence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1301-1328. 
Arora, S. & Gangopadhyay, S. (1995). Toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 28(3), 298–309. 
Astrachan, J. H. (1988). Family firm and community culture. Family Business Review, 1(2), 165-
190. 
Astrachan, J. H., & Jaskiewicz, P. (2008). Emotional returns and emotional costs in privately 
held family businesses: advancing traditional business valuation. Family Business Review, 
21(2), 139-149. 
Bayes, T. (1763). An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. Philosophical 
Transaction of the Royal Society of London, 53, 370-418. 
Bennedsen, M. K, Nielsen, M. K., Pérez-González, F. & Wolfenzon, D. (2007). Inside the family 
firm: the role of families in succession decisions and performance. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 122(2), 647-691. 
Bertrand, M. & Schoar, A. (2006). The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 20(2), 73-96. 
Block, J. (2010). Family management, family ownership, and downsizing: evidence from S&P 
500 firms. Family Business Review, 23(2), 1-22. 
Boer, J. de (2003). Sustainability labelling schemes: the logic of their claims and their functions 
for stakeholders. Business Strategy and the Environment, 12(4), 254–264. 
Brammer, S. & Millington, A. (2006). Firm size, organizational visibility and corporate philan-
thropy: an empirical analysis. Business Ethics: A European Review, 15(1), 6-18. 
BusinessWeek. (2003). Family Inc. November 10, 111-114. 
Campbell, T. S., Marino, A. M. (1994). Myopic investment decisions and competitive labor 
markets. International Economic Review, 35(4), 855-875. 
Chandler, A. D. (1990). Scale and scope: the dynamics of industrial capitalism. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
 30
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H. & Zahra, S. (2003). Creating wealth in family firms through manag-
ing resources: comments and extensions. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27(4), 359-
365. 
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H. & Litz, R. A. (2004). Comparing the agency costs of family and non-
family firms: conceptual issues and exploratory evidence. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 28(4), 335-354. 
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H. & Sharma, P. (2005). Trends and directions in the development of a 
strategic management theory of the family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
29(5), 555-575. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S. & Lang, L. H. P. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in 
East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1), 81-112. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H. & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and 
entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2741-2771. 
Davies, G., Chun, R., Da Silva, R., & Roper, S. (2003). Corporate Reputation and Competitive-
ness. London: Routledge. 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of man-
agement. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20-47. 
Demsetz, H. (1988). Ownership, control, and the firm. New York: Blackwell. 
Deniz, D. & Suarez, M. K. C. (2005). Corporate social responsibility and family business in 
Spain. Journal of Business Ethics, 56(1), 27-36. 
Dyer, W. G. (1989). Integrating professional management into a family owned business. Family 
Business Review, 2(3), 221-235. 
Dyer, W. G. & Whetten, D. A. (2006). Family firms and social responsibility: preliminary evi-
dence from the S&P 500. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(6), 785-802. 
Dlugosz, J., Fahlenbrach, R., Gompers, P. & Metrick, A. (2006). Large blocks of stock: preva-
lence, size and measurement. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), 594-618. 
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 
88(2), 288-307. 
Figge, F., Han, T., Schaltegger, S. & Wagner, M. (2002) The Sustainability Balanced Scorecard 
– linking sustainability management to business strategy. Business Strategy and the Environ-
ment 11, 269-284. 
Flanagan, D. J. & O’Shaughnessy, K. C. (2005). The effect of layoffs on firm reputation. Journal 
of Management, 31(3), 445-463. 
 31
Fombrun, C. J. (1996). Reputation: Realizing value from the corporate image. Boston: Harvard 
Business School. 
Fombrun, C. J. & Shanley, M. (1990). What’s in a name: reputation building and corporate strat-
egy. Academy of Management Journal, 33(2), 233-258. 
Freeman, R.E. (1984). Strategic management: a stakeholder approach. Marshfield: Pitman. 
Froot, K. A., Scharfstein, D. S. & Stein, J. C. (1992). Herd on the street: international ineffi-
ciences in a market with short-term speculation. Journal of Finance, 47(4), 1461-1484. 
Gan, A. (2006). The impact of public scrutiny on corporate philanthropy. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 69(3), 217-236. 
Gomez-Mejia L. R. & Berrone, P. (2009). Environmental performance and executive compensa-
tion: an integrated agency-institutional perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 52(1), 
103-126. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M. & Gutierrez, I. (2001). The role of family ties in agency 
contracts. Academy of Management Journal, 44(1), 81-95. 
Hahn, J. & Doh, J. P. (2006). Using Bayesian methods in strategy research: an extension of Han-
sen et al.. Strategic Management Journal, 27(8), 783-798. 
Hamilton, D. L. & Sherman, S. J. (1996). Perceiving persons and groups. Psychological Review, 
103(2), 336-355. 
Hansen, M., Perry, L. T. & Reese, C. S. (2004). A Bayesian operationalization of the resource-
based view. Strategic Management Journal, 25(13), 1279-1295. 
Hart, S. L. (1995). A natural-resource-based view of the firm. Academy of Management Review, 
20(4), 986-1014. 
Henriques, I. & Sadorsky, P. (1996). The determinants of an environmentally responsive firm: an 
empirical approach. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30(3), 381-395. 
Jacobs, M. T. (1991). Short-term America: the causes and cures of our business myopia. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
James, H. S. (1999). Owner as manager, extended horizons and the family firm. International 
Journal of the Economics of Business, 6(1), 41-55. 
Johnson, H. T. & Kaplan, R. S. (1992). Relevance lost. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Jones, K. & Rubin, P. H. (2001). Effects of harmful environmental events on reputations of 
firms. Advances in Financial Economics, 6, 161-182. 
 32
Karl, H. & Orwat, C. (1999). Economic aspects of environmental labeling. In: Folmer, H., 
Tietenberg, T. (Eds.), The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Econom-
ics 1999/2000. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (UK), 107–170. 
Kepner, E. (1983). The family and the firm: a coevolutionary perspective. Organizational Dy-
namics, 12(1), 57-71. 
King, A. & Lenox, M. (2001). Does it really pay to be green? Journal of Industrial Ecology, 
5(1), 105-116. 
King, A. & Lenox, M. (2002). Exploring the locus of profitable pollution reduction. Manage-
ment Science, 48(2), 289-299. 
Kirchhoff, S. (2000). Green business and blue angels: a model of voluntary overcompliance with 
asymmetric information. Environmental and Resource Economics, 15, 403–420. 
Klein, S. B., Astrachan, J. H. & Smyrnios, K. X. (2005). The F-PEC scale of family influence: 
construction, validation, and further implication for theory. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 29(3), 321-339. 
Koop, G. (2003). Bayesian econometrics. Chicester: Wiley. 
Laverty, K. J. (1996). Economic “short-termism”: the debate, the unresolved issues, and the im-
plications for management practice and research. Academy of Management Review, 21(3), 
825-860. 
Leamer, E. E. (1973). Multicollinearity: a Bayesian interpretation. Review of Economics and 
Statistics, LV(3), 371-380.3 
Le Breton-Miller, I. & Miller, D. (2009). Agency vs. stewardship in public family firms: a social 
embeddedness reconciliation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(6), 1169-1191. 
Lee, M. S. & Rogoff, E. G. (1996). Research note: comparison of small businesses with family 
participation versus family businesses without family participation: an investigation of dif-
ferences in goals, attitudes, and family/business conflict. Family Business Review, 9(4), 423-
437. 
Lepoutre, J. & Heene, A. (2006). Investigating the impact of firm size on small business social 
responsibility: a critical review. Journal of Business Ethics, 67(3), 257-273. 
Levinson, H. (1971). Conflicts that plague family businesses. Harvard Business Review, 
49(March), 90-98. 
Mahon, J. F. (2002). Corporate reputation. Research agenda using strategy and stakeholder lit-
erature. Business & Society, 41(4), 415-445. 
McWilliams, A. & Siegel, D. (2000). Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Perfor-
mance: Correlation or Misspecification? Strategic Management Journal, 21(5), 603-609. 
 33
Miller, D. & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2005). Managing for the long run: lessons in competitive ad-
vantage from great family businesses. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Miller, D. & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006). Priorities, practices and strategies in successful and 
failing family businesses: an elaboration and test of the configuration perspective. Strategic 
Organization, 4(4), 379-407. 
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R. H. & Cannella, A. A. (2007). Are family firms really 
superior performers? Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(5), 829-858. 
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I. & Lester, R. (2010). Family and lone founder ownership and 
strategic behaviour. Journal of Management Studies, in press. 
Morck, R. K. & Yeung, B. (2003). Agency problems in large family business groups. Entrepre-
neurship Theory and Practice, 27(4), 367-382. 
Morck, R. K. & Yeung, B. (2004). Family control and the rent-seeking society. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 28(4), 391-409. 
Narayanan, M. P. (1985). Managerial incentives for short-term results. Journal of Finance, 
40(5), 1469-1484. 
Neubaum, D. O. & Zahra, S. (2006). Institutional ownership and corporate social performance: 
the moderating effects of investment horizon, activism, and coordination. Journal of Man-
agement, 32(1), 108-131. 
Orlitzky, M. (2001). Does firm size confound the relationship between corporate social perfor-
mance and firm financial performance? Journal of Business Ethics, 33(2), 167-180. 
Orlitzky, M. & Swanson, D. L. (2008). Toward integrative corporate citizenship: Research ad-
vances in corporate social performance. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Pearson, A. W., Carr, J. C., & Shaw, J. C. (2008). Toward a theory of familiness: a social capital 
perspective. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32(6), 949-969. 
Porter, M. E. (1992). Capital disadvantage: America’s failing capital investment system. Har-
vard Business Review, 70(5), 65-82. 
Riley, J.G. (2001). Silver signals: twenty-five years of screening and signaling. Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 39(June), 432-479. 
Rossi, P. E. & Allenby, G. M. (2003). Bayesian statistics and marketing. Marketing Science, 
22(3), 304-328. 
Stavrou, E. T., Kassinis, G. & Filotheou, A. (2007). Downsizing and stakeholder orientation 
among the Fortune 500: does family ownership matter? Journal of Business Ethics, 72(2), 
149-162. 
 34
Simerly, R. L. (1995). Institutional ownership, corporate social performance, and firms’ financial 
performance. Psychological Reports, 77, 515-525. 
Shapiro, C. (1983). Premiums for high quality products as returns to reputations. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 98(4), 659-679. 
Spicer, B. H. (1978). Investors, corporate social performance and information disclosure: an em-
pirical study. The Accounting Review, 53(1), 94-111. 
Stanwick, P.A. & Stanwick, S.D. (1998). The relationship between corporate social performance, 
and organizational size, financial performance, and environmental performance: an empirical 
examination. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(2), 195-204. 
Steier, L. (2003). Variants of agency contracts in family financed ventures as a continuum of 
familial altruistic and market rationalities. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(5), 597-618. 
The Economist. 2000. In praise of Bayes. September 28th. 
Tsai, W. H., Hung, J. H., Kuo, Y. C., & Kuo, L. (2006). CEO tenure in Taiwanese family and 
non-family firms: an agency theory perspective. Family Business Review, 19(1), 11-28. 
Turban, D. B. & Greening, D. W. (1997). Corporate Social Performance and Organizational At-
tractiveness to Prospective Employees. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 658-673. 
Uhlaner, L. M., Goor-Balk, H. J. M. & Masurel, E. (2004). Family business and corporate social 
responsibility in a sample of Dutch firms. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Devel-
opment, 11(2), 186-194. 
Waddock, S. A. & Graves, S. B. (1997). The corporate social performance – financial perfor-
mance link. Strategic Management Journal, 18(3), 303-319. 
Wagner, M. (2007). Integration of environmental management with other managerial functions 
of the firm: empirical effects on drivers of economic performance. Long Range Planning, 
40(5), 611-628. 
Waldman, D.A., Siegel, D., & Javidan, M. (2006). Components of transformational leadership 
and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Management Studies, 43(8), 1703-1725. 
Walls, J. L., Phan, P. & Berrone, P. (2007). A Longitudinal Study of the Link between Corporate 
Governance and Environmental Strategy. Paper presented at the Sixty-Sixth Annual Meeting 
of the Academy of Management, Philadelphia, August 3-8. 
Ward, J. L. (2004). Perpetuating the family business: 50 lessons learned from long lasting, suc-
cessful families in business. Marietta, GA: Family Enterprise Publishers. 
Weigelt, K., & Camerer, C. (1988). Reputation and corporate strategy – a review of recent theory 
and applications. Strategic Management Journal, 9(5), 443-454. 
 35
Whetten, D. A. & Mackey, A. (2002). A social actor conception of organizational identity and its 
implications for the study of organizational reputation. Business and Society, 41(4), 393-414. 
Wiklund, J. (2006). Commentary: “family firms and social responsibility: preliminary evidence 
from the S&P 500”. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(6), 803-808. 
Wood, D. J. (1991). Corporate social performance revisited. Academy of Management Review, 
16(4), 691-718. 
Zellweger, T. M. & Astrachan, J. H. (2008). On the emotional value of owning a firm. Family 
Business Review, 21(4), 347-363. 
Ziegler, A. & Seijas-Nogareda, J. (2009). Environmental management systems and technological 
environmental innovations: exploring the causal relationship. Research Policy, 38(4), 885-
893. 
Ziegler, A., M. Schröder & Rennings, K. (2007). The effect of environmental and social perfor-
mance on the stock performance of European corporations. Environmental and Resource 
Economics, 37(4), 661-680. 
Zyglidopoulos, S. C. (2004). The impact of downsizing on the corporate reputation for social 
performance. Journal of Public Affairs, 4(1), 11-25. 
 
 36
Tables to be inserted in the text 
 
Table 1: Univariate analysis 
 
 Mean scores 
 
P-values of two-sided t-tests 
 
 Family-owned  
firms  
(N=321 obs.) 
 
Lone owner  
firms  
(N=182 obs.) 
 
Other firms  
(N=1,719 obs.) 
 
Family-owned firms  
vs. other firms  
(N=2,040 obs.) 
 
Lone owner firms  
vs. other firms  
(N=1,901 obs.) 
 
      
Social responsibility concerns (0; 1; 2)      
      
Community 0.04 0.02 0.10 <0.001 <0.001 
Diversity 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.179 0.364 
Employee 0.21 0.34 0.33 <0.001 0.944 
Environmental 0.16 0.08 0.41 <0.001 <0.001 
Non-US operations 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.127 0.426 
Product 0.30 0.34 0.40 0.011 0.228 
Other 0.33 0.58 0.53 <0.001 0.286 
Total 1.34 1.68 2.06 <0.001 0.005 
      
Social responsibility initiatives (0; 1; 2)      
      
Community 0.41 0.24 0.35 0.157 0.012 
Diversity 0.61 0.57 0.60 0.784 0.577 
Employee 0.52 0.65 0.55 0.345 0.076 
Environmental 0.07 0.09 0.24 <0.001 <0.001 
Non-US operations 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.178 0.702 
Product 0.19 0.36 0.15 0.084 <0.001 
Other 0.05 0.12 0.02 <0.001 <0.001 
Total 1.89 1.94 2.05 0.636 0.374 
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Table 2: Classical random-effects regressions on CSR concerns 
Dependent variable: Social responsibility concerns (on a scale from 0 to 14) 
 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 Coeff. (SE) p-value1 Coeff. (SE) p-value1 Coeff. (SE) p-value1 Ceoff. (SE) p-value1 
         
         
Ownership by lone founder or family (in %) -0.94 (0.41) 0.022 -0.50 (0.40) 0.207     
         
Ownership by lone founder (in %)     -0.23 (0.74) 0.756 -0.44 (0.77) 0.570 
Ownership by family (in %)     -0.57 (0.45) 0.201 -0.76 (0.47) 0.107 
         
Lone founder CEO       0.11 (0.09) 0.225 
Family CEO (dummy)       0.07 (0.11) 0.490 
         
Ownership by institutional investors (in %) 1.00 (0.26) <0.001 0.22 (0.22) 0.307 0.23 (0.22) 0.303 0.26 (0.22) 0.234 
Log (assets) 0.58 (0.04) <0.001 0.24 (0.04) <0.001 0.24 (0.04) <0.001 0.24 (0.04) <0.001 
Debt/ assets (in %) 0.16 (0.19) 0.420 0.02 (0.17) 0.929 0.02 (0.17) 0.931 0.03 (0.17) 0.870 
Return on assets (in %) -0.48 (0.19) <0.001 -0.48 (0.17) 0.006 -0.48 (0.18) 0.006 -0.47 (0.18) 0.009 
Industry concerns (mean)   0.78 (0.03) <0.001 0.78 (0.03) <0.001 0.79 (0.03) <0.001 
Constant 3.19 (0.34) <0.001 1.62 (0.30) <0.001 1.63 (0.30) <0.001 1.71 (0.30) <0.001 
     
     
Obs. (firms) 2,222 (406) 2,222 (406) 2,222 (406) 2,206 (405) 
Obs. per firm: min.; mean; max. 1; 5.5; 10 1; 5.5; 10 1; 5.5; 10 1; 5.4; 10 
R² within, between, overall  0.10; 0.21; 0.19 0.31; 0.47; 0.43 0.30; 0.47; 0.43 0.31; 0.47; 0.43 
Chi² (df) 289.34 (5) *** 975.29 (6) *** 975.12 (7) *** 979.78 (9) *** 
     
 
*** p<0.001    Coeff.=Coefficient; SE=robust standard errors 
1 P-values refer to two-sided tests 
In a different regression, we also used industry dummies to control for industry influences on CSR concerns. The results are similar and can be obtained from the 
authors. 
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Table 3: Classical random-effects regressions on CSR initiatives 
Dependent variable: Social responsibility initiatives (on a scale from 0 to 14) 
 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 Coeff. (SE) p-value1 Coeff. (SE) p-value1 Coeff. (SE) p-value1 Ceoff. (SE) p-value1 
         
         
Ownership by lone founder or family (in %) 0.14 (0.43) 0.745 0.04 (0.39) 0.922     
         
Ownership by lone founder (in %)     -1.04 (0.79) 0.190 -0.93 (0.80) 0.244 
Ownership by family (in %)     0.32 (0.43) 0.449 0.04 (0.46) 0.928 
         
Lone founder CEO       -0.05 (0.11) 0.637 
Family CEO (dummy)       0.20 (0.13) 0.120 
         
Ownership by institutional investors (in %) -0.50 (0.21) 0.016 -0.61 (0.20) 0.003 -0.61 (0.20) 0.002 -0.61 (0.20) 0.003 
Log (assets) 0.32 (0.04) <0.001 0.25 (0.04) <0.001 0.24 (0.04) <0.001 0.24 (0.04) <0.001 
Debt/ assets (in %) 0.05 (0.19) 0.775 0.08 (0.18) 0.652 0.09 (0.18) 0.628 0.10 (0.18) 0.557 
Return on assets (in %) 0.13 (0.15) 0.361 0.03 (0.18) 0.893 0.03 (0.18) 0.870 0.03 (0.02) 0.871 
Industry initiatives (mean)   0.61 (0.04) <0.001 0.61 (0.04) <0.001 0.61 (0.04) <0.001 
Constant -0.90 (3.25) 0.011 -1.39 (0.32) <0.001 -1.37 (0.32) <0.001 -1.35 (0.33) <0.001 
     
     
Obs. (firms) 2,222 (406) 2,222 (406) 2,222 (406) 2,206 (405) 
Obs. per firm: min.; mean; max. 1; 5.5; 10 1; 5.5; 10 1; 5.5; 10 1; 5.4; 10 
R² within, between, overall  0.02; 0.12; 0.08 0.11; 0.28; 0.22 0.11; 0.27; 0.22 0.11; 0.27; 0.22 
Chi² (df) 77.40 (5) *** 304.25 (6) *** 304.60 (7) *** 303.24 (8) *** 
     
 
*** p<0.001    Coeff.=Coefficient; SE=robust standard errors 
1 P-values refer to two-sided tests 
In a different regression, we also used industry dummies to control for industry influences on CSR initiatives. The results are similar and can be obtained from the au-
thors.  
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Table 4: Bayesian random-effects regressions on CSR concerns  
Dependent variable: Social responsibility concerns (on a scale from 0 to 14) 
 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 Median 
Coeff. 
Prob. Co-
eff > 0 
Median 
Coeff. 
Prob. Co-
eff > 0 
Median 
Coeff. 
Prob. Co-
eff > 0 
Median 
Coeff. 
Prob. 
Coeff > 0 
         
         
Ownership by lone founder or family (in %) -1.06 4.5% -0.88 6.9%     
         
Ownership by lone founder (in %)     -1.81 5.9% -1.93 4.9% 
Ownership by family (in %)     -0.62 17.7% -1.17 3.5% 
         
Lone founder CEO (dummy)       0.14 86.4% 
Family CEO (dummy)       0.34 99.2% 
         
Ownership by institutional investors (in %) 1.01 100% 0.24 84.5% 0.23 84.3% 0.30 90.5% 
Log (assets) 0.66 100% 0.12 99.1% 0.11 97.9% 0.12 99.0% 
Debt/ assets (in %) -0.09 34.5% -0.04 41.9% -0.02 46.1% 0.01 51.8% 
Return on assets (in %) -0.54 0.6% -0.53 0.2% -0.51 0.4% -0.51 0.3% 
Industry concerns (mean)   0.78 100% 0.78 100% 0.79 100% 
     
     
Obs. (firms) 2,222 (406) 2,222 (406) 2,222 (406) 2,206 (405) 
Obs. per firm: min., mean, max. 1; 5.5; 10 1; 5.5; 10 1; 5.5; 10 1; 5.4; 10 
     
 
Notes: We use normally distributed priors with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Number of draws: 10,000 (the first 1,000 draws are discarded).. 
The Matlab code used to run the regressions can be requested from the authors. 
In a different regression, we also used industry dummies to control for industry influences on CSR concerns. The results are similar and can be obtained from 
the authors. 
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Table 5: Bayesian random-effects regressions on CSR initiatives  
Dependent variable: Social responsibility initiatives (on a scale from 0 to 14) 
 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 Median 
Coeff. 
Prob. Co-
eff > 0 
Median 
Coeff. 
Prob. Co-
eff > 0 
Median 
Coeff. 
Prob. Co-
eff > 0 
Median 
Coeff. 
Prob. 
Coeff > 0 
         
         
Ownership by lone founder or family (in %) 0.28 69.2% 0.16 62.0%     
         
Ownership by lone founder (in %)     -1.79 3.7% -1.65 7.0% 
Ownership by family (in %)     0.66 84.5% 0.48 79.1% 
         
Lone founder CEO (dummy)       -0.14 11.7% 
Family CEO (dummy)       0.24 96.2% 
         
Ownership by institutional investors (in %) -0.35 5.7% -0.45 1.7% -0.45 1.4% -0.46 1.8% 
Log (assets) 0.29 100% 0.19 100% 0.18 100% 0.18 100% 
Debt/ assets (in %) 0.15 77.9% 0.13 76.0% 0.17 81.4% 0.22 86.9% 
Return on assets (in %) -0.01 49.0% -0.14 22.3% -0.12 25.9% -0.11 26.8% 
Industry initiatives (mean)   0.55 100% 0.56 100% 0.56 100% 
     
     
Obs. (firms) 2,222 (406) 2,222 (406) 2,222 (406) 2,206 (405) 
Obs. per firm: min., mean, max. 1; 5.5; 10 1; 5.5; 10 1; 5.5; 10 1; 5.4; 10 
     
 
Notes: We use normally distributed priors with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Number of draws: 10,000 (the first 1,000 draws are discarded).. 
The Matlab code used to run the regressions can be requested from the authors. 
In a different regression, we also used industry dummies to control for industry influences on CSR initiatives. The results are similar and can be obtained from 
the authors. 
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Figures 1-8: Posterior distributions of the coefficients of the family and founder firm variables 
 
Figure 1: 
Effect of family ownership  
on CSR concerns 
Figure 2: 
Effect of lone founder ownership  
on CSR concerns 
Figure 3: 
Effect of family CEO on CSR concerns 
Figure 4: 
Effect of lone founder CEO  
on CSR concerns 
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Figure 5 
Effect of family ownership 
 on CSR strengths 
Figure 6: 
Effect of lone founder ownership  
on CSR strengths 
Figure 7: 
Effect of family CEO  
on CSR strengths 
Figure 8: 
Effect of lone founder CEO  
on CSR strengths 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Min. Max Mean Median 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 VIF
1 Social responsibility concerns 0 9 1.93 2  
2 Social responsibility initiatives 0 8 1.94 2 0.10  
3 Ownership by lone founder (in %) 0 0.65 0.01 0 -0.02 -0.01 1.31
4 Ownership by family (in %) 0 0.77 0.04 0 -0.13 -0.02 -0.08 1.30
5 Lone founder CEO (dummy 0 1 0.10 0 -0.05 0.05 0.46 -0.07 1.30
6 Family CEO (dummy) 0 1 0.08 0 -0.13 0.01 -0.06 0.40 -0.10 1.20
7 Ownership by institutional investors (in %) 0 0.85 0.13 0.12 -0.00 -0.16 -0.11 -0.22 -0.09 -0.09 1.15
8 Log (assets) 5.85 13.83 8.84 8.61 0.42 0.27 0.01 -0.14 -0.08 -0.09 -0.18 1.29
9 Debt/ assets (in %) 0 1.06 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.03 -0.13 -0.08 -0.09 -0.04 0.06 0.26 1.14
10 Return on assets (in %) -4.58 0.54 0.05 0.05 -0.15 0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.20 -0.13 1.06
11 Industry concerns (mean)     0.61 0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.31 0.23 -0.10 1.15
12 Industry initiatives (mean)     0.07 0.42 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.13 -0.04 0.01 0.11  
 
Notes: VIF=Variance inflation factor (referring to the regression with CSR concerns as dependent variable (Tables 2 and 4); 
N=2,206 obs.; all correlations above r=0.04 or below r=-0.04 have a p-value less than 0.05. 
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Table A2: Description of variables 
 
Variable Description 
Dependent variables  
Social responsibility concerns 
Sum of community concerns, diversity concerns, employee concerns, 
environmental concerns, non-US operations concerns, product concerns, 
and other concerns (source: social performance rating service KLD; 
individual concerns are rated 0,1,2). 
Social responsibility initiatives 
Sum of community initiatives, diversity initiatives, employee initiatives, 
environmental initiatives, non-US operations initiatives, product initia-
tives, and other initiatives (source: social performance rating service 
KLD; individual concerns are rated 0,1,2). 
  
Variables of interest  
Ownership by lone founder (in %) 
Percentage of common stock owned by lone founder; a lone founder is 
an individual who is one of the company’s founders; in these firms, there 
exist no other family members who own more than 5% of the issued 
stock; a firm with lone founder ownership thus cannot be a firm with 
family ownership, nor vice-versa (source: manual data collection from 
the SEC Edgar database) 
Ownership by family (in %) 
Percentage of common stock owned by members of the founding family; 
at least two family members are owners (source: manual data collection 
from the SEC Edgar database) 
Lone founder CEO (dummy 
Dummy=1 if lone founder is CEO; for the definition of lone founder see 
ownership share of lone founder variable (source: manual data collection 
from the SEC Edgar database) 
Family CEO (dummy) 
Dummy=1 if member of the family is CEO; for the definition of family, 
see ownership share of family variable (source: manual data collection 
from the SEC Edgar database) 
Ownership by institutional investors (in %) 
Percentage of stock owned by institutional investors; institutional inves-
tors can include large banks, insurance companies or mutual funds 
(source: manual data collection from the SEC Edgar database) 
  
Control variables  
Log (assets) 
Natural logarithm of  total assets (source: Compustat North America; 
data item: AT) 
Debt/ assets (in %) Long-term debt (in millions of US$) divided by total assets (in millions 
of US$) (source: Compustat North America; data items: AT, DT) 
Return on assets (in %) Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets (in millions of 
US $) (source: Compustat North America; data items: AT, IBCOM) 
Industry concerns (mean) Mean number of social responsibility concerns in the firm’s 2-digit SIC 
industry 
Industry initiatives (mean) Mean number of social responsibility initiatives in the firm’s 2-digit SIC 
industry 
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Appendix A3: Detailed description of Bayesian analysis 
For the prior distribution of the individual effects, we choose a normal distribution. This 
corresponds to a random-effects model specification in classical econometrics. For the coeffi-
cients, we assume a normally distributed prior with a mean of zero for all coefficients. Such a 
prior specification would imply that our model has no explanatory power at all, which ensures 
that any evidence for the existence of a particular effect is not induced by the specification of 
the prior. Furthermore, our particular prior specification ensures that the posterior distribu-
tions functions are identifiable, i.e. we are not ending up with a flat posterior distribution 
(Koop, 2003, p. 291). Finally, the prior of the variance is assumed to follow a χ2 distribution, 
which is consistent with the assumption of normally distributed error terms. 
As a check of the robustness of the results, we also estimated our model with different 
prior specifications. We allowed for different means and variances in the normal distribution 
and for different classes of distributions such as a uniform distribution. Regardless of the prior 
specifications chosen, we obtained basically the same results. 
For the estimation, we used a Matlab code which takes 11,000 draws from the posterior 
distribution (as usual the first 1,000 draws are discarded). As the estimation ends up in a mul-
tidimensional posterior distribution, we applied the Gibbs Sampler to arrive at the correspond-
ing univariate distributions of the coefficients shown in Table 4 and 5, respectively. The 
Matlab code is available from the authors. 
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